China Semiconductor Market for Automotive - Trends and Strategic Recommendation
商品番号 : SMB-80901
| 出版社 | MarketsandMarkets |
| 出版年月 | 2025年6月 |
| ページ数 | 104 |
| 図表数 | 110 |
| 価格タイプ | シングルユーザライセンス |
| 価格 | USD 4,950 |
| 種別 | 英文調査報告書 |
中国の自動車向け半導体の輸出額は、自動運転車や電気自動車の販売増加に牽引され、2020年の2,808億1,000万米ドルから2024年に4,191億5,000万米ドルに達し、年平均成長率（CAGR）8.9%で成長を遂げました。
当レポートはマイクロコントローラー、パワー半導体、センサー＆MEMSデバイス、メモリチップ、アナログ＆ミックスシグナル集積回路など、様々な分野に焦点を当て、中国の自動車向け半導体市場を詳細に分析しています。輸出動向、貿易政策および規制の影響、そして中国以外への半導体産業の多角化についても検証しています。また、代替となる製造拠点についても調査し、それらの拠点の比較分析、そして移行に伴う課題と戦略を提示しています。
さらに世界の自動車セクターが半導体市場に与える影響を評価し、将来予測を行っています。中国の半導体市場の成長を牽引する主要要因に関する詳細な情報も含まれています。主要企業を徹底的に分析することで、各社の事業概要、製品ラインナップ、主要戦略、契約、提携、合意、新製品発売、合併、買収に関する洞察が得られます。
中国の自動車向け半導体市場は、国内外の企業から多額の投資を受けています。SMIC、ファーウェイ傘下のHiSilicon、YMTC、BYDセミコンダクター、清華紫光集団といった大手企業が国内での取り組みを主導する一方、インテル、サムスン、SKハイニックスといった国際企業は、合弁事業や新規製造工場を通じて存在感を高めています。中国政府は、国家集積回路産業投資基金（「ビッグファンド」）、地方政府基金、補助金、減税、低金利融資などを通じて市場を支援しており、これらはすべて自立と完全なサプライチェーンの実現を目指しています。先進的なエレクトロニクス技術や自動車技術に対する世界的な需要が急増する中、中国は香港を貿易拠点として、世界中に半導体を輸出しています。電気自動車やコネクテッドカーを中心とした現代自動車の台頭は、パワートレイン制御、先進運転支援、インフォテインメント、バッテリー管理のための高度なチップを必要とするため、半導体需要を大幅に増加させています。その結果、自動車分野は中国における半導体成長の主要な原動力となっています。
In 2024, China’s exports of automotive semiconductors reached USD 419.15 billion in 2024, from USD 280.81 billion in 2020, with a CAGR of 8.9%, driven by increased sales of autonomous and electric vehicles.
China’s semiconductor market for the automotive sector is experiencing substantial investment from both domestic and global companies. Major players such as SMIC, Huawei’s HiSilicon, YMTC, BYD Semiconductor, and Tsinghua Unigroup are leading domestic efforts, while international firms like Intel, Samsung, and SK Hynix are expanding their presence through joint ventures and new fabrication plants. The Chinese government supports the market with the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (“Big Fund”), local government funds, subsidies, tax breaks, and low-interest loans, all aimed at achieving self-sufficiency and a complete supply chain. As global demand for advanced electronics and automotive technologies surges, China exports semiconductors worldwide, often using Hong Kong as a trade hub. The rise of modern vehicles, primarily electric and connected cars, has significantly increased the demand for semiconductors, as these vehicles require advanced chips for powertrain control, advanced driver assistance, infotainment, and battery management. Consequently, the automotive sector has become a key driver of semiconductor growth in China.
Memory chips are the second-largest segment in China’s automotive semiconductor market.
Memory chips rank second in the Chinese automotive semiconductor market. These chips also hold the second-largest position in the global semiconductor industry due to soaring demand for data storage and processing, driven by AI, data centers, consumer electronics, and advanced automotive technologies. Memory chips are vital for storing and retrieving data in electronic devices, enabling everything from application execution to real-time system operations—an essential requirement for modern vehicles that rely on significant amounts of data for infotainment, ADAS, and autonomous driving features. Memory chips are extensively used in high-end infotainment systems, ADAS, and digital instrument clusters in cars. Electric and autonomous vehicles demand even more memory due to their complex computing and data processing needs. China is focusing on boosting domestic production of mature-node chips while also making significant advancements in advanced memory technology, particularly in NAND and DRAM, with companies like YMTC and CXMT leading the way. YMTC has developed advanced 3D TLC NAND chips that compete with global leaders like Samsung and Micron, while CXMT has produced and released G4 DDR5 DRAM. SMIC has also manufactured 7 nm chips for Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro.
India is the second-largest importer of semiconductors from China.
India is the second-largest importer of electronics, integrated circuits, and memory chips worldwide. This is primarily due to the country’s robust electronics sector, digitalization, and the lack of large-scale domestic semiconductor manufacturing. In 2024, imports of electronic integrated circuits from China alone reached USD 6.1 million. These components are essential in the automotive sector for advanced features such as infotainment, ADAS, telematics, and digital instrument clusters, which require significant memory and processing power. The Indian market for advanced automotive features is rapidly growing, driven by rising consumer demand for connectivity, safety, and electrification. The adoption of EVs and connected cars is accelerating, supported by government initiatives like the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Hybrid and Electric Vehicles (FAME) scheme. Investment in India’s electronics and semiconductor ecosystem is also on the rise, with both domestic and international companies expanding production and R&D. The government has launched incentive programs such as the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for electronics manufacturing, further increasing demand for imported memory and integrated circuits as local supply struggles to keep pace. Recent examples include automakers like Tata Motors and Mahindra integrating more sophisticated electronics into their latest models, reflecting the broader trend of technology-driven growth in India’s automotive and electronics sectors.
Research Coverage:
The report provides an in-depth analysis of the China semiconductor market for automotive, focusing on various types, including microcontrollers, power semiconductors, sensors & MEMS devices, memory chips, and analog & mixed-signal integrated circuits. It examines export trends, the impact of trade policies and restrictions, and the diversification of the semiconductor industry away from China. The report also explores alternative manufacturing destinations, offering a comparative analysis of these locations, along with the challenges and strategies associated with the transition.
Additionally, the report assesses the effects of the global automotive sector on the semiconductor market and presents a future outlook. It includes detailed information about the major factors driving growth in China’s semiconductor market. A thorough analysis of key industry players provides insights into their business overviews, product offerings, key strategies, contracts, partnerships, agreements, new product launches, mergers, and acquisitions.
Key Benefits of Buying this Report:
The report provides valuable information for market leaders and new entrants regarding revenue estimates for both the overall automotive semiconductor market in China and its sub-segments. It will assist stakeholders in understanding the competitive landscape, positioning their businesses more effectively, and planning appropriate go-to-market strategies. Additionally, the report offers insights into the current market conditions and highlights key drivers, restraints, challenges, and opportunities within the industry.
The report provides insights into the following points:
- Analysis of critical drivers (increased domestic investments in semiconductors), restraints (shortage of manufacturing facilities for 12 mm machines), opportunities (substantial investments by <12-inch wafer manufacturers), and challenges (technological gap) influencing the growth of the China semiconductor market for automotive
- Product Development/Innovation: Detailed insights into upcoming technologies and new products launched in the China semiconductor market for automotive
- Market Development: Comprehensive market information – the report analyses the authentication and brand protection market across Chinese countries
- Market Diversification: Exhaustive information about new products & services, untapped geographies, recent developments, and investments in the China semiconductor market for automotive
- Competitive Assessment: In-depth assessment of market shares, growth strategies, and service offerings of leading players, such as SMIC, GigaDevice Semiconductor Inc., Novosense Microelectronics, Silan Microelectronics, and HiSilicon
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION 16
1.1 GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 16
1.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 16
1.2.1 2010–2014 16
1.2.2 2015–2020 16
1.2.3 2021–2025 16
1.3 KEY FACTORS DRIVING INDUSTRY SHIFT FROM CHINA 18
1.3.1 REGULATORY FACTORS 18
1.3.1.1 Restrictive controls by US government 18
1.3.1.2 Chips Act and other global legislation 19
1.3.1.3 National security concerns 19
1.3.2 GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS 20
1.3.2.1 Taiwan Strait tensions 20
1.3.2.2 Russia-Ukraine war 20
1.3.2.3 Technology alliances 21
1.3.2.4 Technology limitations 21
1.3.3 ECONOMIC AND SUPPLY CHAIN FACTORS 22
1.3.3.1 Rising manufacturing costs in China 22
1.3.3.2 Incentives from alternative locations 22
1.3.4 CHALLENGES 23
1.3.4.1 Dependency on foreign IP & architecture and gaps in certification 23
1.3.4.2 Heavy reliance on imported semiconductor manufacturing equipment 23
2 CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 25
2.1 CURRENT STATE OF CHINA’S AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS 25
2.1.1 MICROCONTROLLERS 25
2.1.1.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities 25
2.1.1.2 Future roadmap 26
2.1.2 POWER SEMICONDUCTORS 26
2.1.2.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities 27
2.1.2.2 Future roadmap 27
2.1.3 SENSORS & MEMS 28
2.1.3.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities 28
2.1.3.2 Future roadmap 30
2.1.4 MEMORY CHIPS 31
2.1.4.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities 31
2.1.4.2 Future roadmap 32
2.1.5 ANALOG & MIXED-SIGNAL INTEGRATED CIRCUITS 32
2.1.5.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities 32
2.1.5.2 Future roadmap 33
2.2 MARKET VALUE ASSESSMENT 33
3 KEY PLAYERS IN CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 35
3.1 DOMESTIC MANUFACTURERS 35
3.1.1 SMIC 35
3.1.1.1 Overview 35
3.1.1.2 Recent financials 35
3.1.1.3 Production plants and capacity 35
3.1.1.4 Future strategy 36
3.1.2 GIGADEVICE 36
3.1.2.1 Overview 36
3.1.2.2 Recent financials 36
3.1.2.3 Production plants and capacity 37
3.1.2.4 Future strategy 37
3.1.3 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS 37
3.1.3.1 Overview 37
3.1.3.2 Recent financials 38
3.1.3.3 Production plants and capacity 38
3.1.3.4 Future strategy 38
3.1.4 SILAN MICROELECTRONICS 39
3.1.4.1 Overview 39
3.1.4.2 Recent financials 39
3.1.4.3 Production plants and capacity 39
3.1.4.4 Future strategy 40
3.1.5 HISILICON 40
3.1.5.1 Overview 40
3.1.5.2 Recent financials 40
3.1.5.3 Production plants and capacity 41
3.1.5.4 Future strategy 41
3.1.6 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED 42
3.1.6.1 Overview 42
3.1.6.2 Recent financials 42
3.1.6.3 Production plants and capacity 43
3.1.6.4 Future strategy 43
3.1.7 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR 43
3.1.7.1 Overview 43
3.1.7.2 Recent financials 44
3.1.7.3 Production plants and capacity 44
3.1.7.4 Future strategy 44
3.1.8 NEXPERIA 45
3.1.8.1 Overview 45
3.1.8.2 Recent financials 45
3.1.8.3 Production plants and capacity 45
3.1.8.4 Future strategy 46
3.1.9 CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES 46
3.1.9.1 Overview 46
3.1.9.2 Recent financials 46
3.1.9.3 Production plants and capacity 47
3.1.9.4 Future strategy 47
3.1.10 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP 47
3.1.10.1 Overview 47
3.1.10.2 Recent financials 48
3.1.10.3 Production plants and capacity 48
3.1.10.4 Future strategy 48
3.1.11 GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC. 49
3.1.11.1 Overview 49
3.1.11.2 Recent Financials 49
3.1.11.3 Production plants and capacity 49
3.1.11.4 Future strategy 50
3.1.12 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED 50
3.1.12.1 Overview 50
3.1.12.2 Recent financials 50
3.1.12.3 Production plants and capacity 51
3.1.12.4 Future strategy 51
3.1.13 HESAI TECHNOLOGY 52
3.1.13.1 Overview 52
3.1.13.2 Recent financials 52
3.1.13.3 Production plants and capacity 52
3.1.13.4 Future strategy 53
3.1.14 OTHERS 53
3.2 GLOBAL MANUFACTURERS IN CHINA 54
3.2.1 NXP SEMICONDUCTORS 54
3.2.1.1 Overview 54
3.2.1.2 Recent financials 54
3.2.1.3 Production plants and capacity 54
3.2.1.4 Future strategy 55
3.2.2 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES 55
3.2.2.1 Overview 55
3.2.2.2 Recent financials 55
3.2.2.3 Production plants and capacity 55
3.2.2.4 Future strategy 56
3.2.3 STMICROELECTRONICS 56
3.2.3.1 Overview 56
3.2.3.2 Recent financials 56
3.2.3.3 Production plants and capacity 56
3.2.3.4 Future strategy 57
3.2.4 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 57
3.2.4.1 Overview 57
3.2.4.2 Recent financials 57
3.2.4.3 Production plants and capacity 58
3.2.4.4 Future strategy 58
3.2.5 RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION 58
3.2.5.1 Overview 58
3.2.5.2 Recent financials 58
3.2.5.3 Production plants and capacity 59
3.2.5.4 Future strategy 59
3.3 JOINT VENTURES AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS 59
4 EXPORT ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS 61
4.1 KEY EXPORT PRODUCT CATEGORIES 61
4.2 GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS 62
4.2.1 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (HS CODE 854231) 62
4.2.2 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES (HS CODE 854232) 63
4.2.3 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS (HS CODE 854233) 64
4.2.4 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS) (HS CODE 854239) 65
4.2.5 PARTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (HS CODE 854290) 66
4.3 EXPORTS FROM CHINA 67
4.3.1 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (HS CODE 854231) 67
4.3.1.1 China 67
4.3.1.2 Hong Kong, China 68
4.3.2 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES (HS CODE 854232) 69
4.3.2.1 China 69
4.3.2.2 Hong Kong, China 70
4.3.3 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS (HS CODE 854233) 71
4.3.3.1 China 71
4.3.3.2 Hong Kong, China 72
4.3.4 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS) (HS CODE 854239) 73
4.3.4.1 China 73
4.3.4.2 Taipei, China 74
4.3.4.3 Hong Kong, China 75
5 DIVERSIFICATION OF CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 76
5.1 GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS 76
5.1.1 US-CHINA TRADE TENSIONS 76
5.1.1.1 US-China tariffs 76
5.1.1.2 Diversification strategies 77
5.1.2 TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS 78
5.1.2.1 US & Chinese technology export controls 78
5.1.2.2 Impact of export controls 78
5.1.3 NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 79
5.2 SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE STRATEGIES 80
5.2.1 KNOWLEDGE GAINED FROM COVID-19 PANDEMIC 80
5.2.1.1 Realization by China after Covid-19 80
5.2.1.2 Impact on global players 80
5.2.1.3 Shift from JIT to strategic resilience 81
5.3 ECONOMIC FACTORS 81
5.3.1 RISING MANUFACTURING COSTS IN CHINA 81
5.3.1.1 Cost comparison 82
5.3.1.2 Bill of Materials 82
5.3.2 INCENTIVE PROGRAMS IN ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS 83
5.4 IMPACT ON GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 84
5.4.1 EFFECTS ON AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTION COSTS 84
5.4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN RELIABILITY AND RESILIENCE 84
5.4.3 REGIONAL MANUFACTURING CLUSTERS 84
5.4.4 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION PATTERNS 85
6 ALTERNATIVE MANUFACTURING DESTINATIONS 86
6.1 OVERVIEW 86
6.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE MANUFACTURING LOCATIONS 86
6.2.1 RANKING AS ALTERNATIVES TO CHINA 87
6.3 TECHNOLOGY DOMINANCE, BY COUNTRY/REGION 88
6.4 SOUTHEAST ASIA 88
6.4.1 MALAYSIA 88
6.4.1.1 Government incentives and support 89
6.4.1.2 Key diversifications 89
6.4.1.3 Challenges 89
6.4.2 VIETNAM 90
6.4.2.1 Government incentives and support 90
6.4.2.2 Key diversifications 90
6.4.2.3 Challenges 90
6.4.3 THAILAND 91
6.4.3.1 Government incentives and support 91
6.4.3.2 Key diversifications 91
6.4.3.3 Challenges 92
6.4.4 SINGAPORE 92
6.4.4.1 Government incentives and support 92
6.4.4.2 Key diversifications 92
6.4.4.3 Challenges 93
6.4.5 SOUTH KOREA 93
6.4.5.1 Government incentives and support 93
6.4.5.2 Key diversifications 93
6.4.5.3 Impact of key players 94
6.4.5.3.1 Samsung 94
6.4.5.3.2 SK Hynix 94
6.4.5.4 Challenges 94
6.4.6 TAIWAN 94
6.4.6.1 Government incentives and support 94
6.4.6.2 Key diversifications 94
6.4.6.3 Impact of key players 95
6.4.6.3.1 TSMC 95
6.4.6.4 Challenges 95
6.5 NORTH AMERICA 95
6.5.1 GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND SUPPORT 95
6.5.2 KEY DIVERSIFICATIONS 96
6.5.2.1 US 96
6.5.2.2 Mexico 96
6.5.3 CHALLENGES 97
6.6 EUROPE 97
6.6.1 INCENTIVES BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 97
6.6.1.1 Germany 98
6.6.1.2 France 98
6.6.1.3 Italy 98
6.6.2 EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING HUBS 99
6.7 INDIA 100
6.7.1 GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND SUPPORT 100
6.7.2 KEY DIVERSIFICATIONS 100
6.7.3 CHALLENGES 100
7 FUTURE OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS 101
7.1 PROJECTED INDUSTRY SHIFTS, 2025–2030 101
7.2 TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP 101
7.3 STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS 102
7.3.1 DIVERSIFICATION 102
7.3.2 TECHNOLOGY 102
7.3.3 SUPPLY CHAIN 103
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1 AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR COMPONENTS DOMINATED BY CHINA 17
TABLE 2 US EXPORT CONTROLS AND SANCTIONS 18
TABLE 3 SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPORT PROGRAMS 19
TABLE 4 PRICE HIKES OF SEMICONDUCTOR-RELATED MATERIALS BEFORE
AND AFTER RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 20
TABLE 5 TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES AND THEIR IMPACT ON CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 21
TABLE 6 COUNTRY-WISE INCENTIVES ON SEMICONDUCTOR COMPONENTS 22
TABLE 7 EQUIPMENT AND KEY FOREIGN SUPPLIERS 24
TABLE 8 MICROCONTROLLERS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES,
AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES 25
TABLE 9 POWER SEMICONDUCTORS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES,
AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES 27
TABLE 10 SENSORS & MEMS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES,
AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES 28
TABLE 11 LIDAR: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES,
AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES 30
TABLE 12 MEMORY CHIPS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES,
AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES 31
TABLE 13 ANALOG & MIXED-SIGNAL INTEGRATED CIRCUITS: KEY MANUFACTURERS,
CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES 32
TABLE 14 SMIC: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 35
TABLE 15 SMIC: PRODUCTION PLANTS 35
TABLE 16 SMIC: PRODUCTION CAPACITY 36
TABLE 17 GIGADEVICE: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 36
TABLE 18 GIGADEVICE: PRODUCTION PLANTS 37
TABLE 19 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 38
TABLE 20 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION PLANTS 38
TABLE 21 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION CAPACITY 38
TABLE 22 SILEN MICROELECTRONICS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 39
TABLE 23 SILEN MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION PLANTS 39
TABLE 24 SILEN MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION CAPACITY 39
TABLE 25 HISILICON: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 40
TABLE 26 HISILICON: RECENT FINANCIALS, BY REGION, 2023 VS. 2024 40
TABLE 27 HISILICON: RECENT FINANCIALS, BY BUSINESS SEGMENT, 2023 VS. 2024 41
TABLE 28 HISILICON: PRODUCTION PLANTS 41
TABLE 29 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 42
TABLE 30 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS,
BY SERVICE, 2023 VS. 2024 42
TABLE 31 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS,
BY END MARKET, 2023 VS. 2024 42
TABLE 32 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: PRODUCTION PLANTS 43
TABLE 33 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: PRODUCTION CAPACITY 43
TABLE 34 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 44
TABLE 35 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR: PRODUCTION PLANTS 44
TABLE 36 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR: PRODUCTION CAPACITY 44
TABLE 37 NEXPERIA: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 45
TABLE 38 NEXPERIA: PRODUCTION PLANTS 45
TABLE 39 NEXPERIA: PRODUCTION CAPACITY 46
TABLE 40 CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES: PRODUCTION PLANTS 47
TABLE 41 CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES: PRODUCTION CAPACITY 47
TABLE 42 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 48
TABLE 43 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP: PRODUCTION PLANTS 48
TABLE 44 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP: PRODUCTION CAPACITY 48
TABLE 45 GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC.: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 49
TABLE 46 GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC.: PRODUCTION PLANTS 49
TABLE 47 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS,
2023 VS. 2024 50
TABLE 48 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED: PRODUCTION PLANTS 51
TABLE 49 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED: PRODUCTION CAPACITY 51
TABLE 50 HESAI TECHNOLOGY: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 52
TABLE 51 HESAI TECHNOLOGY: PRODUCTION PLANTS 52
TABLE 52 HESAI TECHNOLOGY: PRODUCTION CAPACITY 53
TABLE 53 OTHER CHINESE AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURERS:
RECENT FINANCIALS AND PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED 53
TABLE 54 NXP SEMICONDUCTORS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 54
TABLE 55 NXP SEMICONDUCTORS: PRODUCTION PLANTS 54
TABLE 56 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 55
TABLE 57 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES: PRODUCTION PLANTS 55
TABLE 58 STMICROELECTRONICS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 56
TABLE 59 STMICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION PLANTS 56
TABLE 60 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 57
TABLE 61 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS: PRODUCTION PLANTS 58
TABLE 62 RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024 58
TABLE 63 RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION: PRODUCTION PLANTS 59
TABLE 64 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN SEMICONDUCTOR
MANUFACTURERS IN CHINA 59
TABLE 65 GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, BY PRODUCT, 2020–2024 (USD BILLION) 61
TABLE 66 CHINA SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, BY PRODUCT, 2020–2024 (USD BILLION) 61
TABLE 67 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS,
BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD BILLION) 62
TABLE 68 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES,
BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD BILLION) 63
TABLE 69 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES,
BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 64
TABLE 70 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS), BY COUNTRY,
2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 65
TABLE 71 EXPORTS OF PARTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS,
BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 66
TABLE 72 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS,
BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 67
TABLE 73 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS,
BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 68
TABLE 74 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES,
BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 69
TABLE 75 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES, BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 70
TABLE 76 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS,
BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 71
TABLE 77 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS, BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 72
TABLE 78 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS), BY COUNTRY,
2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 73
TABLE 79 TAIPEI, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
(EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS),
BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 74
TABLE 80 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
(EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS),
BY COUNTRY, 2020–2024 (USD MILLION) 75
TABLE 81 US-CHINA TARIFFS, 2023–2025 76
TABLE 82 US TARIFFS ON KEY CHINESE PRODUCTS/COMPONENTS 77
TABLE 83 CHINESE SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURERS’ DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES 77
TABLE 84 US TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS AND IMPACT ON CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 78
TABLE 85 CHINESE TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS AND IMPACT ON US AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 79
TABLE 86 CHINA’S ALLEGATIONS OF CYBERSECURITY AND ESPIONAGE 79
TABLE 87 GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN RECALIBRATION: KEY EXAMPLES 80
TABLE 88 COST COMPARISON OF AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS,
2020–2021 VS. 2024–2025 82
TABLE 89 BILL OF MATERIALS OF AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS, 2023 VS. 2024 82
TABLE 90 INCENTIVES/SUBSIDIES FOR AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR
MANUFACTURING OUTSIDE CHINA 83
TABLE 91 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE MANUFACTURING LOCATIONS 86
TABLE 92 TECHNOLOGY DOMINANCE, BY COUNTRY/REGION 88
TABLE 93 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO MALAYSIA AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS 89
TABLE 94 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO VIETNAM AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS 90
TABLE 95 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO THAILAND AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS 91
TABLE 96 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO SINGAPORE AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS 92
TABLE 97 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO SOUTH KOREA AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS 93
TABLE 98 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO TAIWAN AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS 94
TABLE 99 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO US AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS 96
TABLE 100 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO MEXICO AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS 96
TABLE 101 INCENTIVES FOR AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 97
TABLE 102 EUROPEAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING HUBS 99
TABLE 103 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO INDIA AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS 100
TABLE 104 AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP, 2024–2030 101
TABLE 105 STRATEGY FOR COUNTRY SELECTION 102
TABLE 106 STRATEGY FOR TECHNOLOGY SELECTION 103
TABLE 107 STRATEGY FOR COLLABORATIVE MODELS 103
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1 SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY TREND, 1987–2023 17
FIGURE 2 GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, 2020 VS. 2024 33
FIGURE 3 CHINA AND HONG KONG SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, 2020 VS. 2024 34
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